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A Call to Arms:  
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ABSTRACT.   
 
The rhetoric leaders use to speak to domestic audiences about security is not 
simply bluster. Political agents rely upon stories of enmity and threat to 
represent what is happening in the international arena, to whom, and why in 
order to push national and international security policy agendas. They do so 
for the simple reason that a good story is a powerful political device. This 
article examines historical ‘calls to arms’ in the United States, based on 
insights from archival research at US presidential libraries and the US 
National Archives. Drawing on narrative theory and political psychology the 
article develops a new analytic framework to explain the political currency 
and staying power of hero-villain security narratives, which divide the world 
into opposing spheres of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Shifting the conceptual focus away 
from speakers and settings toward audience and affect, I argue that the 
resonance of hero-villain security narratives lies in the way their plot 
structure keeps the audience in suspense. Because they are consequential 
rhetorical tools that shape security policy practices, the stories political agents 
tell about security demand greater attention in the broader field of 
international security studies.  
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The whole world is divided into two camps separated by fundamental principles 
and methods. You are the leader of one camp. The American people should not be 
asked to make the momentous decision of opposing forcefully the actions of the 
evil leaders of the other half of the world possibly because by some accident or 
mistakes American ships or men have been fired upon by soldiers of the other 
camp. They must be brought to that momentous resolution by your leadership 
explaining why any other course than such forceful resistance would be forever 
hopeless and abhorrent to every honoured principle of American independence 
democracy. 
Letter from US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to  
President Franklyn Delano Roosevelt, 24 May 1941 
 
Introduction1 
This article provides a new conceptual framework for understanding the mechanisms of 
narrative persuasion in security politics. Scholars of rhetoric have long reflected upon 
the question of how language moves audiences and what particular words and frames 
are implicated in this process (Alcorn 2002: 20). Grappling with what Laclau (2005:110) 
referred to as ‘force’ rather than form of discourse, this article shows that, for the genre 
of hero-villain security narratives,i a critical part of the answer lies in their emotion-
inducing plot structure. As the following analysis demonstrates, this oscillates between 
two sides that both stand a chance to emerge – at the end – as victorious, and the anxious 
sentiments that this tension stimulates serves to grip the audience. Suspense, alongside 
the affective repertoires used to tell security stories that divide the world, emerges as a 
key device of narrative persuasion.   
A focus on the split of the international arena into two opposing spheres, at the level of 
policy and rhetoric, to convey understandings of security and enmity is not new in itself 
(Campbell, 1998; Neumann 1999; Said 2003). However, the nexus between political 
agents’ discursive practices and affective processes has only recently gained traction 
across the International Relations disciplinary field (Åhäll 2019; Bially Mattern; Bleiker 
and Hutchison 2008; Brassett 2018; Hall and Ross 2019; Koschut et al. 2017; Solomon 
2014). Existing works in the study of security dynamics have shown what role emotions 
play in building, sustaining, limiting, and regulating communities (Koschut 2019; 
Hutchison 2016; Fierke 2013) and in the politics of conflict and violence (Åhäll and 
Gregory 2015; Hutchison and Bleiker 2008; Ross 2014; Steele 2019; Van Rythoven 
2015). While directly speaking to such scholarship the article moves beyond disciplinary 
boundaries and brings insights from narrative research to the study of policy language 
in International Security in order to conceptualize the emotive appeal of security 
narratives that create perceptions of enmity and threat through their dualistic structure.  
International Relations scholarship has recently picked up on the pervasiveness of 
narratives that Roland Barthes (1966) stressed over half a century ago. Such works have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  This article is based on research conducted under ESRC grant ES/K008684/1. I am grateful to the 
anonymous reviewers and the Security Dialogue editorial team for their insightful comments. I would like 
to thank the archivists at all thirteen US NARA-operated Presidential Libraries as well at the US National 
Archives I and II for their invaluable support. While this article only features a small selection of original 
documents, it is based on combing through and analyzing the contents of the vast amounts of speech files 
boxes that the NARA team tirelessly pulled. For their helpful comments I also wish to thank André Broome 
as well as the panel participants at meetings of professional associations where the ideas for this article were 
presented, including the Annual Conventions of the International Studies Association, the International 
Security Studies Section, the British Association for American Studies, the International Society for Political 
Psychology, and the BISA US Foreign Policy Working Group.  
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demonstrated how states utilize ‘strategic narratives’ to shape international politics 
(Freedman 2015; Miskimmon et al. 2013; Krebs and Jackson 2007), how modes of 
rhetorical expression can shape national security policy (Krebs 2015a,2015b; Salomon 
2015; Widmaier 2016), and what role narratives play in processes of identity 
construction (Berenskoetter 2014; Hønneland 2010; Campbell 1998). They have also 
made the case for integrating narratology into feminist security studies (Wibben 2011) 
and the study of terrorism (Homolar and Rodriguez-Merino 2019) and interrogated the 
narratives of the discipline itself (Linklater 2009; Suganami 2008). Yet despite the 
emergence of a ‘narrative turn’ in the study of international politics (Galai 2017; Subotíc 
2016), which increasingly perforates the disciplinary mainstream, such scholarship has 
told us little about what it is that makes a powerful story, and how audiences are drawn 
into lending stories weight. Drawing on US security rhetoric as an empirical anchor, I 
use illustrative examples of text to show how appeals to emotion underpin security 
narrative practices over time. This also demonstrates the need for further 
interdisciplinary research into identifying the affective dimensions of language across 
different narrative genres in the study of international security.  
Calls to arms speeches are a particularly important class of security rhetoric, through 
which political leaders mobilize political support and legitimate the use of force. The 
paper’s analytic focus on American calls to arms speeches in their written form developed 
gradually – and unexpectedly – while I was engaged in a three-year project of conducting 
extensive field research in thirteen presidential libraries, spread across ten states, and 
the US National Archives in Washington, DC, and Maryland. The distinctive theme of 
‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ emerged slowly from analysing many thousands of pages of 
Presidential speeches, including drafts, memos, margin notes, letters, and other related 
textual artefacts. It formed a more concrete line of critical inquiry (one that was quite 
separate from the main project) when it became clear that this specific type of narrative 
dualism is a common thread linking US security rhetoric from the 18th century onwards, 
from Samuel Adams to Donald Trump. While the selection of ‘calls to arms’ speeches 
from the vast number of security texts housed in US archives is therefore deliberate, the 
rationale for focusing on narratives within the hero-villain genre is heuristic; they 
provide a critical entry point for analysis, interpretation, and classifying complex 
narrative processes. 
The article is divided into three sections. The first section discusses ‘narrative essentials’ 
through a focus on the interactive processes of following, framing, and mapping, which 
are integral to the narrative genre. The second section provides examples of the plot 
structure in US security discourse to demonstrate the tendency of security narratives to 
oscillate between heroes and villains. This empirical analysis is centred on examples of 
‘calls to arms’ speeches and is based on primary textual documents physically collected 
in thirteen US presidential libraries and the US National Archives. The final section of 
the article conceptualizes how the effectiveness of hero-villain security narratives is 
structured around their core stylistic resource: the dual-focus rhythm. I argue that the 
pull of hero-villain security stories is located in the way in which the plot structure 
oscillates between tragedy and triumph. This ‘seductive’ rhythm, which works to amplify 
emotive identification with the side of the protagonist, is specific to the genre of hero-
villain security narratives and serves to keep the audience hooked by leaving it in 
suspense over the victory of the protagonist. My argument rests on the premise that 
political agents actively transform the raw material of external dynamics into security 
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narratives to make them intelligible; they have no intrinsic quality that automatically 
fixes their meaning as security events.  
 
Narrative Essentials 
A focus on how political agents ‘speak’, including through performative silences 
(Guillaume 2018), has become widespread in International Relations. As the interest in 
what language does in international politics and international security has begun to 
slowly move from critical scholarship into the disciplinary mainstream, the application 
of the terminology of narratives – both as a research methodii and as an analytical focus 
– has also enjoyed increasing popularity. Against the backdrop of several discursive 
‘turns’, works that are situated at the intersection between narratives and international 
security dynamics are generally associated with approaches that emphasize the 
productive power of language. Indeed, over the past two decades, research in this field 
has made the robust case that narratives of enmity should not be understood as a mere 
representation of an objective threatening reality but as a discursive practice in which 
threats are constituted through language (Doty 1993: 302) that is intertwined with ‘the 
process of identity formation and even the constitution of subjectivity’ (Hansen 1997: 
376).  
Narratives should be understood as the cogs in the wheel of a security discourse.iii 
Because they provide sets of multiple overlapping and interconnected stories, security 
narratives establish a discursive connection between: (a) a country’s national interests; 
(b) the identification of specific security threats to these interests; and (c) how potential 
risks to the broader international environment are understood and addressed. But what 
precisely is a narrative? Despite the recent rise in research that engages with narratives 
as a consequential rhetorical tool, a clear definition of narratives in IR scholarship has 
remained elusive. While Ronald Krebs’s work (2015a, 2015b) is a welcome exception to 
the reluctance of IR scholarship to analytically pin down the concept of the political 
narrative, we continue to find a multiplicity of applications of the narrative terminology, 
often with little explanation of the meaning of the term itself or how an analytical focus 
on narratives may help to better understand security dynamics. Before moving onto 
exploring the grip of security stories that put heroes and villains in international security 
in the spotlight, it is therefore imperative to clarify what the essential features of a 
narrative are. 
At a very basic level, the narrative genre is concerned with a text delivered by a single 
speaker. What sets narratives apart from other modes of communication in monologue 
form, such as argumentation, explanation, or description, is their capacity for meaning-
making and sensemaking. Whether we approach them from the perspective of literary 
theory, anthropology, history, or psychoanalysis, narratives are the core mechanism, 
carrier, and ingredient of constructing reality at the socio-cognitive level (László 2008: 
9). As Mayer (2014: 66, 71) puts it: ‘By translating experience into the code of story – 
with plot, and character, and meaning – we make the unfamiliar familiar, the chaotic 
orderly, and the incomprehensible meaningful.’ People rely upon narratives to make 
sense of the world, to reduce complexity, and to comprehend new information and 
events. As vehicles for structuring information, action, and experience, narratives render 
matters ‘real’, and they give meaning to what would otherwise be incomprehensible 
(Selbin 2010). In short, narratives enable us to cognitively capture the many complex 
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relationships and events that are integral to our everyday lives, and they allow us to make 
sense of seemingly unconnected phenomena (Fludernik 2009: 1; Miskimmon et al. 2013: 
5). 
Yet the stories we tell and are being told also provide a lens through which we see the 
material world. They shape our opinions and feelings toward others and ourselves, 
toward what is right and wrong, and toward what happens, when, and why (Capps and 
Ochs 1995: 53). As such, narratives are more than simply a form of communicating 
information and experiences, more than a mere means for ‘someone telling someone else 
that something happened’ (Herrnstein Smith 1980: 232). They are a wider societal tool 
for sensemaking and an instrument for creating self-identity (Mattingly 2007; White 
1987: 26; see also Bruner 1991). Narratives do not simply ‘exist’, nor do they materialize 
organically. Rather, they are constituted through the interaction between the text,iv the 
narrator, and the audience’s interpretative activity, and this also holds for political 
narratives, including those centered on enmity and threat. At the heart of this dynamic 
and relational process lie the three essential narrational practices of following, framing, 
and mapping. 
The storyteller’s following a character activates both the character and the narrator as 
the core constitutive elements of a narrative (Altman 2008: 15-7). In the case of security 
narratives, the narrator is commonly a political agent who lends her voice to a specific 
story, independent from who may have created it – like the narrator in the latest work of 
fiction we may grab off the sales shelves in an airport bookshop. Through the narrator 
we learn who the protagonists and antagonists of a story are that we need to focus on. A 
security narrative is a story about hopes, fears, expectations, and uncertainties in the 
international arena that political agents convey to recipients by ordering ‘different 
narrational elements such as time, location, and actors into a story centred on the main 
character(s)’ (Bal 2009: 9, emphasis removed).  
The narrator also delimits and systematizes the chaotic raw materials of events to make 
them legible and recognizable as part of the story. This act of framing provides the 
narrative with a beginning and an end, transforming a series of events into a causally-
related sequence of events (Altman 2008: 18). A narrative is thus more than a chronicle 
of one event after another: it contains a plot that details the temporary transition from a 
starting situation to a final situation, which also juxtaposes an initial problem with its 
route to resolution (Greimas 1971:83; Vogel 1994: 255). Like well-known works on 
narratives from literary theorists, such as Labov and Waletzky (1967/1997), Prince 
(1982), and Ricoeur (1984-88), Krebs points to the selective integration of at least two 
events that are temporally brought into a meaningful relationship as a core marker of 
security narratives (Krebs 2015: 137; see also Richardson 2000: 169-70). However, the 
notion of the security event should not be understood as ontologically prior to the 
security narrative. Although security narratives require a temporal structure, whether 
and how events are included in the security story implies narrational agency. This 
‘emplotment’ underscores that interpretations of an event as a security episode, while 
linked to the phenomenology of the event, are the result of an inter-subjective process of 
meaning-making in which the rhetorical choices made by political agents play a crucial 
role. A security narrative, as a genre and type of text, cannot exist independently from a 
narrator’s activity; it requires the interactive teaming up of the political agents who tell 
stories with the material world. As László (2008: 12) emphasizes, ‘Narrative always 
creates its own reality’.  
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A narrative contextualizes its characters and their traits as well as the actions, events, 
and places it focuses on. It does so through language that pushes us to discover 
connections between different parts of the narrative as well as other texts, occasions, and 
experiences. This psycho-linguistic process of mapping involves the use of semantic 
units that function as cognitive cues in the message text, which invoke pre-existing 
mental prototypes that bind together disparate clusters of ideas, objects, behaviours, 
concepts, and relationships by reimagining them in recognizable terms: what is novel is 
presented within a familiar code (Spradley 1980: 100; Altman, 2008: 18; Scovel, 1978: 
129). 
This implies that narrative cover terms – or schemas – provide audiences less with 
reasoning shortcuts but rather ‘tell’ people how to reason, thereby serving both as a 
roadmap to meaning-making (Walker 2000: 126) and as an obscure filter through which 
we see the world (Efran 1994: 222). A prominent example from the security realm is the 
use of the terminology of ‘appeasement’ to justify the use of military force, which triggers 
the reasoning shortcut that conciliatory responses to hostility will only encourage further 
aggression. Because people do not make judgments about a new situation in a discursive 
vacuum, when political agents rely upon such discursive anchoring through salient 
cognitive reference points in their security stories, they prime us to evaluate what is new 
within familiar frames and to link together contemporary security events with earlier 
episodes, even if this involves disregarding or downplaying the substantive differences 
between them (Homolar and Rodriguez 2019).  
The discussion of narrative essentials underscores that the selection of what particular 
elements and events the stories of security contain and how they are presented 
necessarily colours them with subjectivity on the part of the narrator and the audience 
(see Bal 2009: 8). Differences in the selection of words by political agents will push public 
sentiment and reasoning about security issues in a particular direction, even more so if 
the audience is poorly informed about them (e.g. Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996: 250; 
Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Indeed, depending on what they put the spotlight on, security 
narratives can plot the world very differently (Krebs 2015: 138). This, in turn, suggests 
that security narratives should be understood as ‘multidimensional purposive 
communication’ (Phelan and Rabinowitz 2012: 3) that remain at their core a work of 
fiction. Funkenstein (1992: 79) emphasized that narratives are ‘an exercise in “world-
making”’, and, as the following suggests, hero-villain narratives in US security discourse 
are a case in point.  
 
Dividing the World in US Security Discourse 
Political agents have long understood the significance of creating and controlling the 
narrative. They are mindful that political speeches – in particular those that are 
epideictic such as ‘calls to arms’ and legitimations of a country’s position towards a 
named enemy – are a primary vehicle with which to seize narrative control over an 
unfolding or existing security situation (see Martin 2016). v  In a letter to President 
Franklyn Delano Roosevelt, for example, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter (1941: 
1) recounts the purpose and power of an upcoming speech by the US President. Defining 
presidential leadership as a ‘task of education done on a vast scale’, he suggests that the 
Americans ‘must have their convictions renewed and incontestably established’, and that 
the key to reach their minds is the ‘repetition and concreteness’ of the story. The 
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narrative core of the speech Frankfurter wrote about was that Hitler did not only 
represent an ‘immediate menace’ to Europe alone but was also a threat to everything the 
US cherished and stood for; that an intervention was necessary in order to preserve 
America itself (ibid). Frankfurter’s letter points explicitly to the importance of tapping 
into and reaffirming existing societal values as well as to the necessity of reiterating the 
story for it to stick, in particular when seeking to move audiences into action.  
This implies that not all security narratives work equally at the level of social interaction. 
Indeed, few stories of enmity and threat enjoy a long shelf life and instead tend to fade 
from the public sphere once a rhetorical reinterpretation of the security environment is 
introduced (Homolar 2011). However, one story type that has been a particularly 
persistent feature in US security discourse are hero-villain security narratives. To 
develop a more in-depth understanding of how these political narration processes work 
in practice and why they resonate and may, in specific circumstances, endure over time, 
the following discussion uses historical episodes of calls to arms by US presidents. As see 
shall see, while the different stories of security in hero-villain narratives may change, the 
basic dual-focus structure of their narrative arc – their narrative engine – remains clearly 
identifiable. 
Throughout American history since the founding of the republic, political speeches that 
are centered on calls to arms and security policy legitimations have relied heavily on 
oscillating between tragedy and triumph for the US as the hero in these security stories, 
in which the possibility of a tragic outcome always features. A passionate speech by 
Samuel Adams on American Independence before the Continental Congress at the State 
House in Philadelphia on 1 August 1776 provides an example of the long history of this 
narrative dynamic. Adams begins by calling attention to a surprising set of achievements 
by the Settlers, and he weds these to a common goal. ‘We are now on this continent, to 
the astonishment of the world three millions of souls united in one cause’, Adams 
declares. ‘We have large armies… our success has staggered our enemies’. After opening 
his remarks with a positive statement of current affairs, he shifts the spotlight onto the 
infamous ‘political Sodom’, which the Settlers had fled and explains that the 
revolutionaries ‘cannot suppose that our opposition has made a corrupt and dissipated 
nation [the British Empire] more friendly to America, or created in them a greater 
respect for the rights of mankind.’ Adams does not linger on this point for long, however, 
and instead intertwines his story about how the ‘adversaries are composed of wretches’ 
with the Colonies’ sacrifices for the ‘justice of their cause’, switching the narrative focus 
between the opposing sides. Rather than ending by expressing a clear conviction of 
victory in the war against the British, Adams instead concludes by an expressing the 
desire ‘that these American States may never cease to be free and independent’, 
representing an idealized image of the future.  
To make his case against the continued submission of the Colonies to Englishmen, 
Adams thus drew significantly upon the abstract dualism of tyranny and freedom. The 
US Declaration of Independence on 4 July 1776 had already used this dichotomy to draw 
a line between the British Crown and the Revolutionaries, stating that a prince whose 
every act defines him as a ‘Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.’ Adams, 
however, assigned specific characteristics generally associated with uncivilized behavior 
to the British rulers. They would, he noted, ‘claim authority to manage them [the 
Colonies] though disgraceful to humanity by their ignorance, intemperance, and 
brutality’. Englishmen, he declared, were people who had ‘either ceased to be human’ in 
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the case of the ruling tyrants, or were those ‘who have not virtue enough to feel their own 
wretchedness and servitude’. In contrast, Adams claimed, the Revolutionaries were on 
the side of freedom and human progress. In his call to arms against the British he 
underscored that what was at stake in the uprising of the Colonies was a much broader 
fight for freedom, a rhetorical tool that US political leaders today still frequently utilize. 
‘Our contest,’ he stated, ‘is not only whether we ourselves shall be free, but whether there 
shall be left to mankind an asylum on earth, for civil and religious liberty?’ 
An exemplar of the dual-focus narrative style to articulate and interpret a broader threat 
from the international environment is President Harry S. Truman’s (1949) Inaugural 
Address, commonly known as the ‘Four Point Speech’, which articulated an expanded 
vision for the international role of the US amidst the ‘grave uncertainty’ of the postwar 
world. As the text of this speech is significantly longer than the previous example, it helps 
to illustrate the rhythm at work in hero-villain security narratives in greater depth. 
Truman set the scene by creating an unsettled picture of the present. ‘Today marks the 
beginning not only of a new administration’, he observed, ‘but of a period that will be 
eventful, perhaps decisive, for us and for the world.’ From the outset of his story, he sows 
doubt over America’s fate in the unfolding history while placing its actions at the heart 
of US destiny. ‘It may be our lot’, Truman declared, ‘to experience, and in a large measure 
bring about, a major turning point in the long history of the human race.’ This creates 
the momentum to carry the audience forward to an affirmation of core American values, 
which are represented as timeless and shared across society, to make this story as much 
a collective one as one that each spectator can relate to. Then, suddenly, the initial state 
of affairs is disrupted, and a reversal of America’s fortune looms. ‘In the pursuit of these 
aims’, Truman warns, ‘the United States and other like-minded nations find themselves 
directly opposed by a regime with contrary aims and a totally different concept of life… 
That false philosophy is communism.’ Here, the 33rd US President reaches the centre of 
his plot, which from this point moves the focus repeatedly between the protagonist and 
antagonist of the story, between (American) democracy and (Soviet) communism.  
A handwritten note attached to the 16 January 1949 speech draft advised the President 
and his speechwriters to ‘state these differences not to draw issues of belief as such, but 
because the actions resulting from the communist philosophy are a threat’vi, which was 
reiterated by Dean Acheson’s (1946, emphasis in the original) instruction from 17 
January 1949 to ‘bring out …that the President is not directing his words at what 
Communists think to themselves but what they do to other people’.  By the time General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Truman’s successor, addressed the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors on 16 April 1953 the sombre notion of a rift in the world between 
‘East’ and ‘West’ that firmly placed the blame on the actions of the former had become 
the central theme of US security discourse:  
‘The nations of the world divided to follow two distinct roads. The United 
States and our valued friends, the other free nations, chose one road. The 
leaders of the Soviet Union chose another.’ (Eisenhower 1953a) 
A key purpose of the speech was to seriously invite Soviet cooperation in building a 
peaceful world – alongside serving as a ‘salutary reminder… of the need for continued 
effort and sacrifice’ (Nitze 1953:  1, 4). Shortly after Eisenhower’s second term in office, 
however, a wall had been erected in Berlin to split Germany and the world into two 
opposing spheres of a communist East and a capitalist West. The comparative 
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parallelism with an irreconcilable difference between two sides of the hero-villain 
narrative had become a material dividing line.   
Toward the end of the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan (1987) famously asked the 
leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, to ‘tear down’ the Berlin Wall. Yet the 
prospect of a new world order that could transcend a binary division of the international 
arena proved to be remarkably short-lived. The threat of the ‘evil empire’ was quickly 
replaced by dangers emanating from isolated Third World ‘rogue’ countries (Homolar 
2011) and international terrorist ‘savages’ (Finlay 2009). On 2 August 1990, President 
George H.W. Bush criticized the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as an unprovoked surprise 
attack ‘in blitzkrieg fashion’ against a peaceful neighbor. Bush characterized the event as 
an ‘outrageous and brutal act of aggression’. Importantly, the President underscored that 
this stood in stark contrast to what he described as a new era with the potential to become 
‘an age of freedom, a time of peace for all peoples’. ‘As was the case in the 1930’s’, Bush 
declared, raising the spectre of appeasement and Adolf Hitler, ‘we see in Saddam 
Hussein an aggressive dictator’. Behind the scenes, the US security establishment feared 
that without prompt and decisive action that forced the Iraqi dictator to retreat from 
Kuwait, ‘Saddam will start appearing as a hero able to stand up to the superpower’ (Haass 
1990a: 3). At the same time there, was an acute awareness that gaining authorization for 
the use of military force would require a long and sustained process of ‘conditioning all 
constituencies, including the public, Congress, allies, key Arabs and others to the fact 
that … a peaceful resolution of the crisis was fast running out’ (Haass 1990b: 2). 
The example of Bush’s framing of Iraq’s action is significant not just because of the 
centrality of dichotomies such as aggression and peace and its implicit representation of 
a simple choice between action and inaction, whereby inaction would likely squander the 
opportunity for entering a new world order. It is also representative of the post-World 
War Two trend for US presidents to intertwine vocabulary associated with Nazi Germany 
with contemporary notions of aggression, tyranny, and savagery. A case in point is Bush’s 
successor President William J. Clinton, who justified NATO’s military intervention in 
Kosovo on 24 March 1999 in similar fashion. While placing the innocence and weakness 
of victims ‘sprayed with bullets’ in direct opposition to the savagery and strength of their 
attackers, the 42nd US President linked the events in Kosovo via the tragedy of Bosnia a 
few years earlier to the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany. What happened in Bosnia, 
he stated, ‘was genocide in the heart of Europe, not in 1945 but in 1995; not in some 
grainy newsreel from our parents’ and grandparents’ time but in our own time, testing 
our humanity and our resolve.’  
President George W. Bush perhaps most infamously divided the world into opposing 
spheres in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, bringing to life a 
powerful dual-­‐‑focus narrative about the threat posed by the savagery of international 
terrorism that was embedded in the rich heritage of dualistic terminology in US security 
rhetoric (notably Bush 2002). Operating largely in the background during the Obama 
presidency (e.g. Obama 2014, 2015) the emphasis on driving a moral wedge between the 
United States and US enemies reminiscent of Bush’s rhetoric gained renewed 
momentum under Donald Trump, even though his rhetorical abilities only occasionally 
rose above those of a fourth-grade student (Wang and Liu 2017; cf. Homolar and Scholz 
2019). During his first official overseas trip, Trump (2017) declared the fight against 
terrorism to be ‘a battle between barbaric criminals who seek to obliterate human life 
and decent people… a battle between good and evil.’ The 45th President not only 
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replicated the rhetoric of savagery in framing enmity, but also nurtured the image of a 
black and white world in which the solutions to complex problems are simple. 
These examples of calls to arms speeches illustrate that while we may disagree about who 
warrants the label of hero in these stories, the use of the dualistic plot structure of hero-
villain narratives – the form or framework of their unfolding story – in US security 
discourse has remained remarkably consistent over time. Each of the historical examples 
discussed portrays two antithetical sides in competition with each other, with the United 
States serving as the story’s protagonist and the enemy of the time as the diametrically 
opposed antagonist who is dehumanized as an evil villain. The pervasiveness of hero-
villain narratives in US security discourse suggests that political agents appreciate them 
as a powerful rhetorical tool to move audiences toward taking action – toward doing 
something to tip the scales in favour of the protagonist. How do they achieve this? As we 
shall see, the key to understanding the ‘grip’ of hero-villain security narratives can be 
found in their dualistic structure: they achieve audience impact because their side-by-
side positioning of elements that are in palpable tension, even incongruity, with each 
other fosters our engrossment and emotional investment in the story.  
 
The Seductive Rhythm of Tragedy and Triumph in Hero-Villain Narratives 
Characteristic for the genre of hero-villain security stories is that a social hierarchy of 
states with gradations of difference in values is markedly absent in this narrative 
universe (cf. Towns and Rumelili 2017; Broome et al. 2018). Hero-villain narratives 
instead represent the world in categorical terms of difference as fundamentally split 
between mutually-exclusive visions, like the struggle between the forces of good and evil 
represented in J.R.R. Tolkien’s dual-focus narrative of Middle-earth in The Lord of the 
Rings. This holds for both the binary division of the world into two opposing spheres in 
which the ‘evil’ continuously stands a good chance of gaining the upper hand, as well as 
the lexicon that defines the character and actions of the two opposing sides. Hero-Villain 
security narratives are therefore ‘“ethically constitutive” stories’ (Smith 2003: 59): they 
are narratives which ‘have special capacities to inspire senses of normative worth’.  
The plot of hero-villain narratives – the sequence of causally-related events from the 
story’s beginning to its resolution – oscillates between tragedy and triumph for the side 
of the protagonist. As we saw above, this typically begins with an affirmation of the 
societal values and progress of the protagonist. It then shifts abruptly from ‘good’ to ‘evil’, 
giving the antagonist the edge, but the prospect of a turning tide is kept alive. The story 
is set and kept in motion by first tilting the balance between the two opposing sides 
toward the side of non-alignment, enmity, and threat. It then continues to eschew a 
lasting resolution of the conflict between the opposing sides, creating uncertainty over 
the hero’s final victory.  
The portrayal of the villain in these security stories is typically that of a powerful enemy 
-malevolent, ruthless, and capable – who seeks to plunge the world into darkness and 
barbarity. In the narrated contest between good and evil, the antagonist, be it Adolf 
Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Saddam Hussein, or Osama Bin Laden, sees eye-to-eye with the 
protagonist and is evil by choice – the same as fictional villains ranging from Sherlock 
Holmes’s Professor Moriarty to Batman’s Joker, Harry Potter’s Lord Voldemort, and the 
Avengers’ evil demigod Thanos. The world of hero-villain security narratives is thus one 
of ordered uncertainty with clear-cut boundaries – rather than a complex, ambiguous, 
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and chaotic universe – in which the antagonist colours the story and gives it purpose. 
The plot of the hero-villain security narrative features a world spiralling towards 
catastrophe if no action is taken; it is the exceptional responsibility of the hero to prevent 
the catastrophe and to ensure the defeat of the villain. 
What makes this type of security narrative so effective, and by extension so popular in 
the realms of both fiction and politics, is that the dual-focus structure does more than 
simply sustain the momentum of the story. It also keeps the audience hooked and 
captivated by the story because it creates suspense over logically-opposed outcomes. 
Dual-focus security narratives stimulate a desire by the audience to know the conclusion 
of the story, while continuously frustrating this desire through not resolving the tension. 
The lack of resolution creates purposeful suspense, an ‘emotional state provoked by the 
uncertainty of an expected outcome’ (Prieto-Pablos 1998: 100). This has two key 
constituents of emotion that we experience in relation to future events, towards what 
could happen (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1998: 131-2): hope that the hero will emerge 
victorious and fear that events will instead take a negative turn.  
From the perspective of narrative research, suspense is one of the core narrative affects 
- ‘a curious mixture of pain and pleasure’, of euphoria and dysphoria, generated by the 
prospect of disturbing outcomes, peril, and harm to characters that are liked, and which 
triggers an affective reaction (Barnet et al. 1971: 107; see also Raney 2011; Zillmann 1980; 
1996). Dual-focus security narratives are thus built upon an emotionally-charged plot 
structure that revolves around the audience’s experience of apprehension about 
undesired alternatives, a plot structure that creates emotional tension and anxiety by 
signaling uncertainty and a loss of control. While the audience might hope, or even 
expect, their side of alignment will be triumphant in the end, hero-villain narratives draw 
the audience in emotionally through oscillating between heroes and villains, and 
between tragedy and triumph, continuously creating the anticipation of the protagonist’s 
doom (Brewer 1996; Caroll 1996). As Keen (2015: 154) notes, ‘Suspense hinges on the 
cognitive states of “what if”, enlivened by the anxious feelings of “how long?”’. Whereas 
the classical hero-story takes the protagonist on a well-trodden path through perdition 
only to emerge from it victorious and enlightened (Campbell 1949), in hero-villain 
narratives the more absorbed audiences are by the uncertain outcome of the story, the 
more likely it is to generate a strong emotional response. 
In addition to the outcome (un)desirability integral to the hero-villain narrative’s plot 
structure, character identification is a particularly important factor in shaping our felt 
suspense and emotional investment in the story (Doicaru 2016). While we may initially 
disagree about who warrants the label of hero in the narrative, the use of dualistic 
terminology encourages the audience from the outset to categorize events, actions, and 
characters that drive the narrative’s plot along a fault line, pushing us to sympathize and 
ally with one of the story’s opposing sides over a second (Altman 2008: 66, 336). This 
attachment, is an essential part of narrative identification; that is, ‘the process of taking 
on a character’s identity and situational perspective’(Bilandzic and Busselle 2017: 19), 
which also fosters the process of absorbing the narrative (Tal-Or and Cohen 2010: 404). 
Hero-identification, rather than shared attitudes, exerts significant persuasive influence 
on audiences (De Graaf et al. 2012: 803). Fostering the vicarious experience of 
attachment is a powerful rhetorical device to move audiences because it makes us feel. 
The protagonist of  dual-focus narratives generally attracts empathy, affinity, and 
feelings on the positive valence spectrum because of the way in which qualities assigned 
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to the character resonate emotionally with the audience (even if the boundary between 
hero and villain is ambiguous). We tend to imagine ourselves as the hero of the story to 
the extent that we vicariously experience and absorb the character’s emotions and 
personality (Slater and Rouner 2002: 178). Kinsella, Ritchie, and Igou (2015: 7) argue 
furthermore that heroes – in fiction and in our everyday lives – who are associated with 
behaving ‘in ways that benefit others, sometimes at great personal risk, are likely to 
increase positive feelings towards the hero’ as it reminds us of the good in the world. 
Indeed, the ‘good guy’ who figures in hero-villain security stories is usually portrayed as 
a (self)sacrificing character who comes to the rescue of others and the world.vii This is 
echoed in how President Eisenhower (1953a,1953b) narrated America as a hero that 
deserved to defeat the Communist ‘scheme of regimentation’ precisely because of its 
‘sheer value to mankind’, or in President’s Clinton’s (1999) assertion that America’s 
involvement in Kosovo was imperative to ‘save innocent lives and preserve peace, 
freedom, and stability in Europe.’ The appeal of the hero, then, ‘lies in their fulfilment of 
important cognitive and emotional needs, such as our need for wisdom, meaning, hope, 
inspiration, and personal growth’ (Allison and Goethals 2016: 188).  
The process of identification with the hero through the ‘good’ qualities – addressing, in 
a Lacanian sense, a desire to overcome lack – is relational in that it (re)creates the 
connection with a broader community and the values it wears on the sleeve. The most 
relatable heroes are those that tap into our collective consciousness – often featuring 
whiteness and masculinity as implicit constitutive categories (Nakayama and Krizek 
1995: 293). Calling upon what is familiar in order to generate identification serves to 
invoke mutual experiences, such as the notion of a common past and shared values, 
foster recognition, a sense of rightness, and sway the feelings of the audience (Keen 
2012). Hero-identification thus serves as a confirmation of a shared worldview at the 
societal level in conjunction with ‘important healing and self-esteem-building functions 
at the individual level’ (Allison and Goethals 2016: 195). The dark side of this bounded 
strategic empathy is its tendency to bias audiences against an outgroup that is 
represented as a distant ‘outside other’, including in terms of space, time, morality, and 
code of conduct, as is the case in hero-villain security narratives. While we project 
ourselves into the hero, we cast off the villain. As Kristeva (1982: 2) puts it: ‘I must 
violently reject it to assert myself as “I”, and “Not that”.’  
This overlaps with a now long line of research in international security investigating the 
performative constitution of identity at the level of the self and the collective (e.g. 
Campbell 1998; McSweeney 1998). Yet a focus on narrative processes of identification 
emphasises that these ‘create the direct intimacy of collective experience in a conscious 
dimension through reference’ (Laszlo 2008: 9) and increase the potential persuasive 
effects of stories and messages (Cohen 2001: 260). The capacity of the audience to 
retrieve cognitively stored information about belonging is triggered by the narrative, 
including the plot-structure and the words it contains.  
The significant persuasive influence of hero-villain security narratives stems from the 
multidimensional emotive effects evoked by the suspense-generating rhythm of the 
story, which is pushed further through dualistic language that fosters processes of hero-
identification. Through fostering a cognitive-emotive process of differentiation and 
identification, hero-villain security narratives achieve dissociation with the antagonist 
and attachment to the protagonist – evoking collective sentiments of both aggression 
and empathy. To paraphrase Cohen (1963), the way in which hero-villain security 
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narratives work to create the characteristics of the opposing sides do not tell us what to 
think but what to think about because they communicate a ‘cultural code’ and channel 
how information contained in a narrative is interpreted. While they are neither tangible 
nor concrete, the dualistic abstractions that hero-villain narratives feature so 
prominently are linked to our prior experiences, individually and collectively, and help 
stir audiences into action through evoking an extreme sensual affective experience, 
bodily and emotionally. By drawing an unambiguous line between the ingroup and the 
outgroup, this type of security story (re)creates what a community imagines as admirable 
and desirable as much as it reflects its fears and conceptions of deviance.  
What matters most here in terms of their broader socio-political consequences is that 
dual-focus security narratives inculcate a preference for taking urgent political actions 
that might tip the scales in favour of the protagonist. When audiences are in a state of 
suspense, they are primed to release emotional tension through the prospect of regaining 
control over the direction of the story (Prieto-Pablos 1998: 101). This distinguishes dual-
focus security narratives from texts that generate feelings of resignation and 
hopelessness on the one hand, and confidence and optimism on the other, which imply 
that nothing can be done to change the course of events (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1998: 
132). The importance of striking a delicate balance between the prospects for defeat or 
victory, of not falling into a weakness trap that pushes the audience towards passive 
acceptance of a negative situation from the viewpoint of the protagonist, has not escaped 
political agents. In a confidential Memorandum about the 1951 State of the Union 
addressed to then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, his special advisor Marshall D 
Shulman (1950) stressed that President Truman’s State of the Union speech to Congress 
‘should clarify our position on questions raised by the isolationist challenge. [The 
m]essage should have enough confidence and reassurance to correct recent over-
emphasis on our weakness.’ Keeping the rhythm in balance is key to the effective use of 
a security narrative: projecting either too much unrivalled strength or too much 




Stories that divide the world between heroes and villains, between good and evil, have 
persistently formed a cornerstone in the repository of how political agents speak security 
in the United States. The moral of the story in these hero-villain security narratives is 
represented in absolutes with nothing in-between. This holds for the lexicon that defines 
the character and actions of the two opposing sides as much as for their bipartite 
structural features. While they should not be understood as one-size-fits-all blueprints 
for political agents to call audiences into action or rally a nation behind a vision, they 
have played a lasting role in grounding arguments within US security discourse.  
The article sought to unlock the puzzle of why stories that divide the world between 
heroes and villains, between good and evil, have persistently formed a cornerstone in the 
repository of how political agents speak security. It has illustrated how integrating extra-
disciplinary insights, particularly those from narrative research and political psychology, 
can help us to develop a more granular understanding of the popularity and endurance 
of genre-specific narratives as a representational device. Rather than relying on the 
conventional understanding in International Relations that different types of political 
narratives work in similar ways, in the genre of hero-villain security narratives the article 
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has illustrated how the rhythm of tragedy and triumph is an integral part of narrative 
persuasion that is at work when political leaders divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’. A 
useful methodological strategy for security narrative analysis is to engage in a reflexive 
and intertextual approach to archival research, and further scholarship is needed to 
investigate the dynamics of hero-villain narratives in other cases. 
Challenging the problematic assumptions of earlier International Relations scholarship, 
this analysis of how narrative persuasion works for the genre of hero-villain security 
narratives reveals that it is not merely ‘the social condition regarding the position of 
authority’ in relation to the audience that facilitates the social construction of enmity and 
threat (see Buzan et al. 1998: 33). Rather, the relationship of the audience to the 
narrative content is fundamental for understanding why a particular security narrative 
resonates with the wider public. The notion that affective responses frequently enter – if 
not commandeer — conscious awareness has recently begun to gain greater traction in 
the field. Drawing inspiration from the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Solomon (2018) has 
illustrated how a cognitively uncertain environment not only impacts upon individuals’ 
sense of agency and security, but can create a broader societal affective resonance, 
binding together collectives in ways that alter the conditions of political possibility. The 
analysis in this article contributes to this emerging body of critical security studies 
research by examining how political leaders can potentially use rhetoric in deliberate 
ways to trigger audience anxiety and uncertainty, in order to provide a persuasive 
articulation of security threats and how to respond to them.  
Ted Sorensen (1962), President John F. Kennedy’s speechwriter and one of his closest 
advisers, claimed that ‘We all know that words are symbols which call forth emotional 
responses in all of us.’ The main argument developed here provides an important step 
towards further advancing scholarship on the systematic analysis of affective sources and 
dynamics of narrative persuasion. Hero-villain narratives emotionally ‘grip’ their 
audiences through the seductive rhythm of tragedy and triumph, by keeping them in 
suspense over the likelihood with which an undesirable outcome can be averted. 
Whether a presidential call to arms resonates with an audience in ways that might foster 
the conditions of possibility for political action depends on the extent to which emotive 
responses are triggered by the rhetorical choices political agents make to ‘speak’ security. 
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ENDNOTES 
i The concept of a hero-villain narrative is one of many discursive practices and does not suggest that 
language preserves a stable meaning over time and escapes its context-boundedness.  
ii  Methodologically, narrative approaches have become a research tool in IR to zoom in on individual 
experiences and the way people tell their stories. They frequently utilize auto-ethnography and narrative 
writing, centring on researchers’ subjective experience and the dynamics between the researcher as narrator 
and the subject under investigation, as well as problematizing the language of research (see Brigg and Bleiker 
2010; Ruback 2010; Inayatullah 2010).  
iii  A security discourse is defined as a series of practices and representations that (re)produce specific 
meanings of security, vulnerability, and threat, and which thereby delineates the field of political and ethical 
possibility within which security policy can take place (see Milliken 1999; Bialasiewicz et al. 2007: 406; 
Butler, 1995: 138; Weldes et al 1999: 16-17). 
iv  Text is broadly conceived as a performative semantic unit of meaning, medium of expression and 
communication, and manifestation of discourse. 
v Political speechwriting is a complex process that involves input from a range of political agents and the 
performance of their delivery also varies significantly, both of which impacts upon the audiences’ ability to 
make sense of and support the narrative they contain. Of the over eighty presidential speechwriters since 
Judson T. Welliver wrote for President Warren G. Harding in 1921 – who is generally considered the first 
official presidential speechwriter in the modern sense of the occupation – very few have been women and 
only since the 1980s. These include Peggy Noonan, Mari Maseng Will, and K. T. McFarland (Reagan); 
Katherine Reback  (Clinton); Charlie Fern  (G.W. Bush); Sarah Hurwitz (Obama); and Brittany Baldwin 
(Trump) as well as female speechwriters in lower positions such as Sarada Peri (Obama); Mary Kate Cary 
(George H.W. Bush).  
vi This section, as many others in the speech, were significantly more wordy in draft form than the 
delivered speech. Earlier drafts prompted advice for changes so that the text is ‘shorter, more punch, 
means the same, tis not gobbledygook’ (Clifford Papers 1949; emphasis in the original). 
vii A note printed in The National Intelligencer on 9 February 1831 (Badger’s Message 1831) drew an image 
of a worthy American as that of a (white male) ‘Crusader, who went away in youth, and came back with grey 
hairs, to bring the first news of his deeds and the fate of innumerable warriors who went with him’.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
